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As one reads through the introduction to David Stamos’s book, his declamatory phrases 
about evolution (or evolutionary biology) and its various antagonists reminds me of the 
preliminaries to a TV bout from World Wrestling Entertainment. There is much 
posturing, accompanied by ominous forewarnings of the impending battle, but by the 
time the card is finished, the fights themselves turn out to be scripted, inconclusive and 
involve much less drama than was initially promised. 
 
Any book that combines evolution and sex in the title automatically creates certain 
expectations – one wonders what could be added to sex, race and religion to create even 
more explosive content? While I began the book with anticipation, the sense of unease 
created by the title unfortunately only grew as I read the introduction and then moved 
into the nine chapters, each with its own declamatory title that begins “Evolution and...” 
Stamos clearly sees himself as a champion, but his foes are much less clear-cut than he 
maintains at the outset. 
 
The advice he notes from the editorial staff at Blackwell to move away from the 
anthology he proposed to this current volume has created some of the problem. Their 
instinct was accurate, as an anthology of various previously-published writings on 
evolutionary ideas, put together in the manner of an eighteenth-century natural history 
museum where the intellectual relationships (should there be any) are left to the reader 
to discern, would have been a waste of trees. Yet the book tries too hard to present a  
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dialectic, when in fact Stamos is at his best explicating the work that such an anthology 
might have contained. Every chapter contains nuggets of explanations of the work of 
other people that are clear, fair and well-written; the resulting analysis that purports to 
move the dialectic on toward some victorious conclusion is much less persuasive. 
 
Stamos, who teaches philosophy at York University, begins: “There is a debate raging 
in virtually every college and university in the Western world, and also widely among 
the public. It is whether evolutionary explanations – Darwinian explanations – can 
legitimately be extended to the big questions that vitally concern us, questions that fall 
outside biology as normally circumscribed” (1). These big questions deal with “matters 
between the sexes, racial issues, religion, and so much more.” Stamos sees this debate 
as “the interdisciplinary question par excellence,” and his book as “a critical 
introduction” that operates “on a number of levels” as it engages both the general 
public and an audience of students in college and undergraduate university courses. 
This is all fair enough, but the task he has set himself is surely an arduous one (even as 
a critical introduction) and he then unfortunately proceeds to hobble the argument with 
a series of dubious premises and debatable conclusions. 
 
He offers the magisterial statement that he is not concerned with “the defense of 
evolutionary biology per se.  That debate is dead among scientists and the intellectual 
world as a whole.” Had this statement been left as it stood, the reader might wince a 
little and move on, but Stamos goes further, making the claim that “evolutionary 
science is one of the greatest and most solid of human achievements, possibly even the 
greatest of all time” (2). He then declaims “to deny evolution is to deny the very nature 
and value of evidence itself,” for reasoning that is not based on evidence that ignores it 
or even fights against it, is reasoning that invites moral condemnation.” To further 
anchor the extreme position and throw down the metaphorical gauntlet, “disrespect for 
evidence translates psychologically and socially into a culture of lies and power 
politics, not a culture that values truth and justice.” 
 
One might by this point (and on page 2!) be forgiven for thinking Stamos just has an 
axe to grind and that the “critical introduction” would be better represented as an 
intellectual offensive. The enemy has yet to be named, though (not surprisingly) it is 
soon identified as those proponents of the “intelligent design theory” that Stamos says 
is merely creation science in a new guise. He pulls no punches: “This theory, along 
with its previous incarnation as creation science, is essentially mythological thinking 
masquerading in a lab coat. It is the attempt to take a way of thinking common to 
frightened and ignorant people living in pre-scientific societies, a way of thinking 
possibly rooted deeply in human nature, and to make it intellectually respectable. But 
no matter how it is dressed, its explanations are not real explanations, it makes no 
testable predictions (because one cannot test the will of an invisible creator or 
designer), and it opens up no fruitful lines of research. In short, the public has been 
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bamboozled by an enormous propaganda machine driven by the religious right wing” 
(2-3).  
 
Stamos’s “critical introduction” then takes on the rhetorical purpose of a foray into 
hostile territory, “to question whether and to what extent evolutionary biology shines 
light on the big questions debated in the humanities and social sciences, questions that 
concern us all. Adding evolution to these questions has the effect of making them 
controversial in the extreme” (3). 
 
Whatever the reader’s opinion of the clarion call against the unsavoury proponents of 
intelligent design theory (whoever the “far enemy” on the right might actually be), 
however, Stamos fights his particular battle against the “near enemy” on the left of 
those who adhere to the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM). Discussed by 
evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Toomby in their 1992 publication 
“The Psychological Foundations of Culture” and then pilloried by Paul R. Gross and 
Norman Levitt (Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science, 
1998), the representations Stamos offers himself of the SSSM model are sufficiently 
vague that they would not survive contact with the evidence of what “those people” 
actually do. Acknowledging that he “can only paint in broad strokes in this 
introduction,” Stamos promises the real dirt will emerge in the ensuing chapters, but 
that it is “useful at this point to set the nature of the debate as an opposition between 
evolutionary models and the SSSM. Understanding each in its pure form will help to 
recognize and evaluate them when are mixed” (3). 
 
While Stamos doesn’t admit his volume is intended as a salvo in the so-called Science 
Wars, the attempted depictions of the two solitudes “each in its pure form” is more than 
a clue. One wonders who pushed him at places to the ultimately indefensible positions 
he takes, however, because elsewhere in the book he offers a reasonable assessment of 
what is needed in terms of the “big questions” he identifies: “The truly interdisciplinary 
challenge, then as I see it, and it is the real debate, is to try and figure out as best one 
can just where the SSSM is right and where it is wrong and to be fearless about it, even 
if that means throwing political correctness to the wind at times. Biology in general and 
evolutionary biology in particular need to be taken seriously, both if we want to truly 
understand the human condition and if we believe knowledge is power and we want to 
support the most effective ways of bettering the world” (8). Had he focused on 
explicating the applications of evolutionary biology instead of asserting a dichotomy 
between it and some SSSM “other,” the book would have accomplished more than 
unfortunately it does. 
  
The first two chapters, “Evolution and Knowledge” and “Evolution and 
Consciousness,” explore how we know what we know, and why and how we came to 
think it. While I have real difficulties accepting language about the evolution of 
scientific theories by natural selection as anything but a category error, Stamos skips 
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through “evolutionary epistemology” en route to a discussion of consciousness that 
poses the question about what distinguishes humans from animals. Both chapters 
remain inconclusive, as he itemizes the problems with applying evolutionary biology to 
these issues. The anchor for these first chapters, though, is found in the third chapter, on 
“Evolution and Language,” in which he points up Noam Chomsky’s idea of a 
“universal grammar” that is (in effect) hard-wired into our genes and therefore able to 
be considered in terms of evolutionary advantage and natural selection. While arguably 
something of a chicken and egg scenario, language comes first, and then epistemology 
and consciousness. Thus however inconclusive his application of evolutionary biology 
to knowledge and consciousness in the first two chapters, the way in which we are able 
to conceive of these two things and then to communicate them in language “seems best 
explained by standard evolutionary principles” (86) thanks to Chomsky and Steven 
Pinker. 
 
Unfortunately, just as the book and its argument gets on track, we reach the 
metaphorical centrefold, “Evolution and Sex.” Essentially a Cook’s tour of research 
exploring mating, sexual activity and reproduction in terms of evolutionary biology, it 
is an interlude that plays to the student audience, one suspects, and signals the start of a 
series of stand-alone chapters on “big questions” that do not advance the debate in any 
constructive direction. To make things worse, that Chapter 5 is “Evolution and 
Feminism,” and Chapter 6 is “Evolution and Race” reflects a move from centrefold to 
centre stage and some questionable performance. 
 
While you may need to go through the sequence of Stamos’s argument in each of these 
chapters to be convinced of my assessment, he in effect argues that we are who we are 
because of our genes, and genetic selection thus likely has taken place both in terms of 
gender and race. He recognizes the explosiveness of both claims, but says “objective” 
science must account for the ways in which a variety of environmental pressures and 
opportunities have resulted in selection of certain genetic traits that may be linked 
either to gender or to race. As much as he was playing to the crowd in Chapter 4 in 
talking about sex, here Stamos is self-consciously standing apart from the crowd to 
provide a perspective on what evolutionary biology might teach us about both gender 
and race. It is a dangerous tack, as he realizes: “At this point my own motives have 
probably come under suspicion, but I really do not care. My only desire has been to 
argue that, from an evolutionary point of view, there is nothing inherently mistaken or 
wrongheaded, let alone evil, in supposing that there are racial...differences in IQ or in 
other character traits within wide-ranging species such as Homo sapiens” (149). Not 
content to leave it at that, he continues: “Any aversion to research in this area is 
basically socially and politically motivated, it is not biologically motivated [sic]. At the 
end of the day, when all is said and done, it remains possible—indeed, quite possible—
that from a modern evolutionary point of view there are innate statistical differences, 
even significant differences, in aptitude and behaviour between different human races” 
(149, Stamos’s emphasis). While after this Stamos climbs on a rhetorical soap box, 
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calling for tolerance, and ends with quoting Martin Luther King Jr.’s wisdom about 
how it is the content of a man’s character that matters, not the colour of his skin, this 
reader is still made queasy about how similar arguments about racial difference have 
been used in the past to justify the most horrific of crimes against humanity. (Survey 
the literature on eugenics offered by entirely respectable and reasonable people in the 
1920s and 1930s, for example, and how it later underpinned the work of Josef 
Mengele.) The aside with which the chapter ends is equally disquieting – the 
intellectual question as to whether there might be a racism instinct, linked to group 
membership or territoriality, which supposedly needs research to determine which 
“side” (evolutionary biology or SSSM) is correct about its nature and origins. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 7, is a lengthy exploration of the way evolutionary biology 
might account for or explain various possibilities for ethical behaviour. Stamos 
concludes that “morality in humans is neither socially constructed, primarily rational, 
no divinely revealed, but has a common core or denominator that is the product of our 
evolutionary past in hunting-gathering groups. As such, morality is not absolute (eternal 
and unchanging) and it is not personally subjective (a matter of what each individual 
thinks) but it is objective, in the sense that adaptive traits are objective in a species” 
(175). While he makes a good point about the objective character of adaptive traits and 
their capacity to be considered in evolutionary terms, morality is such a slippery fish 
that being able to (objectively) categorize it in a way that escapes the vagaries of 
cultural context seems impossible. When this supposedly adaptive trait of morality is 
tied to religion in Chapter 8, however, the fish escapes his grasp. 
 
In “Evolution and Religion,” Stamos begins with a wholly inadequate assessment of 
what might be meant by religious beliefs, especially in terms of truth and falsity, before 
investigating three questions: “whether it is useful to view religious beliefs and 
practices as memes [proposed by Richard Dawkins and developed by others] subject to 
evolutionary processes....whether a religion instinct evolved in the human species, in 
similar fashion to the language and moral instincts...[and]whether evolution and 
religion can be legitimately combined into what is known as “theistic evolution” (178). 
These three questions – surely there might have been others? – are brusquely proposed 
and summarily dismissed. Even if all manner of religious beliefs could in fact be 
subsumed under the rubric of “theology” (which they cannot), Stamos declaims that 
“the spirit of theology is deeply incompatible with the spirit of science” (196-97). In the 
end, he concludes that “we have seen evolutionary principles applied to religion at the 
level of memes, then to the level of instincts, and then finally to the attempt to 
harmonize evolution with theology, all with devastating results” (213) for the objective 
character or validity of religious experience. Stamos might claim to find such a result 
“devastating,” but the reader is hardly surprised, given the incendiary start to the book 
and the perfunctory way in which this penultimate “big question” is considered. 
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Whatever flaws there are elsewhere in the book, Stamos deserves credit for even 
attempting to tackle such a huge topic as “Evolution and the Meaning of Life” in a final 
chapter. He explores the relationship between existentialism and evolutionary biology, 
reflecting on whether evolution adds, takes away or has no relevance for the meaning of 
life, and whether we have “an evolved instinctual need” to find meaning in our lives 
(215). He is clearly unwilling to live in an entirely meaningless universe; he is no 
existentialist, because he feels that humans have “a nature” (228), and as a species 
characteristic, such “nature” is not merely asserted by the individual. (“In evolutionary 
biologists, but not in existentialists, a deep instinct for the meaning of life is more or 
less satisfied, and it is one that cannot be satisfied in any way one chooses” (227).) In 
the end, he prefers Robert Nozick’s conclusion (Philosophical Explanations, 1981) that 
humans have two ways of satisfying their inherent desire for meaning, either through 
the pursuit of knowledge or through personal relationships. He sees this as “an evolved 
instinct for meaning,” something (in other words) that might confer an evolutionary 
advantage, musing in conclusion at the end of the book: “Even if physics is right and 
the universe as a whole has no meaning, it does not necessarily follow that one of its 
parts, life as a whole, has no meaning. And even if evolutionary biology is right and life 
as a whole has no meaning, it does not necessarily follow that one of its parts, my life 
or yours, has no meaning. In spite of the truths of evolution and physics, we each can 
still have a deeply meaningful life.” (229). 
 
It would take more space than I have here to go through the whole book and identify 
the number of times concepts (like “instinct”) are reified in a way contrary to the “just 
the (evolutionary) facts” approach Stamos maintains he is taking, but by the end of the 
book, one is not entirely surely what the fight was about or who won. (In fact, his very 
last sentence almost indicates a conversion to the sort of position against which he rails 
in the introduction!) “Truth” and “fact,” like “science,” are used liberally as though 
their definitions are axiomatic and self-evident, and even what is meant by “evolution” 
has about as much semantic specificity as one finds in Thomas Kuhn’s use of 
“paradigm” in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The dialectic does not 
materialize, nor does an SSSM approach emerge from the nine chapters in a way even 
approximating the caricature found in the introduction to provide some counter-point to 
whatever light evolutionary biology shines on the various topics he covers. While 
Stamos is disdainful of hypothetical social scientists on the left and archetypal Christian 
conservatives on the right who do not get their science correct when it comes to 
understanding evolutionary biology, he opens himself up to an equivalent accusation of 
his own inability to understand what either of these groups (should they even exist in 
some objectively verifiable state) think about everything from sex to the meaning of 
life, with stops at morals, ethics and religion in between. 
 
As a text in a course on philosophy of biology, Stamos’ book would be pedagogically 
useful if read in the context of some of the authors (like Richard Dawkins, Steven 
Pinker and Michael Ruse) that he cites. Were I able to wave a wand, however, I would 
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remove the chapters on sex, feminism and race, and challenge him to articulate more 
clearly the conclusions he tries to reach in his final chapter. Stamos deserves credit for 
wrestling with questions from which other scholars would happily shy away, and the 
implications of a universal grammar for the development of some adaptive traits we 
might label “morality,” “ethics” and “religion” are certainly intriguing. It is to be hoped 
that this book is a starting point for further reflection by him on these “big questions,” 
perhaps in a less overtly polemical context. 
 
As for the apparatus in the book, the appendix (“Common Misconceptions About 
Evolution”) is short and not particularly helpful, though the short glossary identifies 
some of the terms with which a reader might not be familiar. The bibliography (entitle 
“References”) is to works cited or used, not to the field of evolutionary biology itself. 
The index of names and key words is important for the reader who wishes to read only 
portions of the book or follow only some of the questions Stamos considers. The book 
is attractive, well-laid out, and without any typographical errors – a worthwhile 
addition to a library of books on the implications of evolutionary theory, though itself 
needing to be read with caution. 
 
